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Abstract
We investigate the complexity of r-Approval control problems in k -peaked elections, where at most k peaks
are allowed in each vote with respect to an order of the candidates. We show that most NP-completeness
results in general elections also hold in k -peaked elections even for k = 2, 3. On the other hand, we
derive polynomial-time algorithms for some problems for k = 2. All our NP-completeness results apply
to Approval and sincere-strategy preference-based Approval as well. Our study leads to many dichotomy
results for the problems considered in this paper, with respect to the values of k and r. In addition, we
study r-Approval control problems from the viewpoint of parameterized complexity and achieve both fixed-
parameter tractability results and W[1]-hardness results, with respect to the solution size. Along the way
exploring the complexity of control problems, we obtain two byproducts which are of independent interest.
First, we prove that every graph of maximum degree 3 admits a specific 2-interval representation where every
2-interval corresponding to a vertex contains a trivial interval (a single point) and, moreover, 2-intervals may
only intersect at the endpoints of the intervals. Second, we develop a fixed-parameter tractable algorithm
for a generalized r-Set Packing problem with respect to the solution size, where each element in the given
universal set is allowed to occur in more than one r-subset in the solution.
Keywords: single-peaked elections, multipeaked elections, approval voting, control, parameterized
complexity
1. Introduction
Voting is a common method for preference aggregation and collective decision-making, and has applica-
tions in many areas such as political elections, multi-agent systems and recommender systems [17, 40, 41, 44].
However, by Arrow’s impossibility theorem [1] there is no voting system which satisfies a certain set of desir-
able criteria when more than two candidates are involved (see [1] for further details). One prominent way to
bypass Arrow’s impossibility theorem is to restrict the domain of preferences, for instance, the single-peaked
domain introduced by Black [5]. Intuitively, in a single-peaked election, one can order the candidates from
left to right such that every voter’s preference increases first and then decreases after some point as the
candidates are considered from left to right. See Figure 1 for an example.
Recently, the complexity of various voting problems in single-peaked elections has been attracting
attention of many researchers both from theoretical computer science and social choice communities [7,
21, 23, 27, 43]. It turned out that many voting problems which are NP-complete in general elections become
polynomial-time solvable when restricted to single-peaked elections. However, most elections in practice are
not purely single-peaked, which motivates researchers to study more general models of elections. We refer
readers to [8, 12, 14, 19, 22, 46, 49] for some generalizations and variants of single-peaked elections. In this
IA preliminary version of this paper appeared in the proceedings of the international conference AAMAS 2014 [48], and
informal proceedings of the international workshop M-PREF 2013.
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Figure 1: An illustration of a single-peaked election. There are five candidates a, b, c, d, e and three voters, whose preferences
are illustrated by the dark line, the gray line and the dotted line, respectively. For instance, the preference illustrated by the
dark line signifies that b is preferred to d to e to c to a.
paper, we consider a natural generalization of single-peaked elections, called k -peaked elections, where each
vote is allowed to have at most k peaks with respect to an order of the candidates. This generalization
might be relevant for many real-world applications. For example, consider a group of people who are willing
to select a special day for an event. In this setting, each voter may have several special days which he/she
prefers for some reason, and the longer the other days away from these favorite days, the less they are pre-
ferred by the voter. k -peaked elections with k being a small constant may also arise in the scenario where
initially the election is single-peaked and then some voters are bribed and rank some specific candidates
higher in order to get some extra benefits (e.g., money, permission, etc.) from the bribers. In addition,
k -peaked elections also play an important role in politics [11, 17]. We refer to the work of Egan [17] for a
detailed discussion of how and when k -peaked political elections arise in real-world political settings. Very
recently, k -peaked elections have been also studied in the context of facility location problems [26].
In this paper, we are concerned with control problems for r-Approval restricted to k -peaked elections. In
a control problem, there is an external agent (e.g., the chairman in an election) who is willing to influence
the election result by carrying out some strategic behavior. There could be two goals that the external agent
wants to reach. One goal is to make some distinguished candidate win the election, and the other goal is to
make the distinguished candidate lose the election. A control problem with the former goal is referred to
as a constructive control and with the latter goal as a destructive control in the literature [3, 31]. Moreover,
the strategic behavior may involve adding/deleting a limited number of votes/candidates. We refer readers
to [3, 20, 31] for further discussions on control problems. In this paper, we study only constructive control.
Hereinafter, “control” means “constructive control”.
Approval is one of the most famous voting systems and has been extensively studied both in theory and
in practice. In Approval, we are given a set C of candidates and a set V of voters, each of whom approves
or disapproves each candidate c ∈ C. The candidates with the most approvals are winners. r-Approval is a
variant of Approval where r is a positive integer. In particular, in r-approval each voter v casts a vote piv
defined as a linear order over the candidates and approves exactly the top-r candidates. 1-Approval is often
referred to as Plurality in the literature [2, 3]. Another prominent variant of Approval is the sincere-strategy
preference-based Approval (SP-AV for short), proposed by Brams and Sanver [6]. In SP-AV, each voter
provides both a linear order of the candidates and a subset C of candidates such that the candidates are
approved according to C, and the “admissible” and “sincere” properties should be fulfilled. In particular,
for each voter v, the set C of approved candidates should contain the top-rv candidates (according to the
linear order) for some integer rv. We refer to [6, 20] for the precise definition of SP-AV.
Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra and Rothe [31] proved that control by adding/deleting votes for Approval
is NP-complete. The proofs can be adapted to show the NP-completeness of control by adding/deleting votes
2
k -peaked elections
k = 1 k = 2 k ≥ 3 k = dm/2e
P(♠)
r is a constant: r ≤ 3: P (♦) r ≤ 3: P (♦)
adding P (Theorem 1) r ≥ 4 NP-complete: r ≥ 4: NP-complete (♦)
votes r is not a constant: (Theorem 5) r is a constant: FPT
NP-complete (Theorem 2) w.r.t. R (Theorem 7)
P(♠)
r ≤ 2: P (♦)
deleting r ≤ 2: P (♦) r ≥ 3: NP-complete (♦)
votes r ≥ 3: NP-complete (Theorem 3) r is a constant: FPT
w.r.t. R (Theorem 6)
adding
P (♠) r ≥ 1: NP-complete (4) r ≥ 1: NP-complete (4) r ≥ 1: W[2]-hard
candidates w.r.t. R (♣)
deleting
P (♠) r ≥ 1: NP-complete (4) r ≥ 1: W[1]-hard r ≥ 1: W[2]-hard
candidates w.r.t. R (Theorem 8) w.r.t. R ()
Table 1: A summary of the complexity of r-Approval control problems. Our results are in bold. In this table, “P” stands
for “polynomial-time solvable”, and R in an entry is the solution size in the corresponding problem. Note that dm/2e-peaked
elections are general elections, where m denotes the number of candidates. All results apply to the unique-winner and the
nonunique-winner models. Moreover, all our NP-complete results apply to both Approval and SP-AV. However, there is no
“r” in either case. Results marked by ♦ are from [34], by ♣ from [35], by ♠ from [23], by 4 from [22] and by  from [4].
for SP-AV [20]. Lin [34] established many dichotomy results for r-Approval control problems with respect
to the values of r. In particular, Lin proved that control by adding votes for r-Approval is NP-complete if
and only if r ≥ 4, and control by deleting votes for r-Approval is NP-complete if and only if r ≥ 3. As for
control by modification of candidates, Approval turned out to be immune1 to control by adding candidates
and polynomial-time solvable for control by deleting candidates [31]. However, control by adding/deleting
candidates for r-Approval is NP-complete, even when degenerated to 1-Approval [3]. The NP-completeness
also holds for SP-AV [20]. Recently, Approval and r-Approval control problems have been considered in
single-peaked elections. In particular, Faliszewski et al. [23] proved that control by adding/deleting votes
for Approval is polynomial-time solvable in single-peaked elections2. Moreover, control by adding/deleting
candidates for 1-Approval is polynomial-time solvable in single-peaked elections [23].
Motivated by the NP-completeness in the general case and the polynomial-time solvability in the single-
peaked case, we study the complexity of control by adding/deleting votes/candidates for r-Approval in
k -peaked elections, aiming at exploring the complexity border of these control problems with respect to
various values of k and r. Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra and Hemaspaandra [22] studied a notion of nearly
single-peaked elections which is called Swoon-SP and is a special case of 2-peaked elections. They proved
that control by adding/deleting candidates for 1-Approval is NP-complete when restricted to Swoon-SP
elections, implying the NP-completeness of these problems in 2-peaked elections. We complement their
results by studying the adding/deleting votes counterpart. Our findings are summarized in Table 1. In
1A voting system is immune to a control problem if one cannot make a non-winning candidate a winner by performing the
corresponding strategic behavior.
2In [23], an Approval election is single-peaked if there is an order of the candidates such that each voter’s approved candidates
are contiguous in the order.
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particular, we show that if r is a constant, control by adding votes for r-Approval is polynomial-time
solvable in 2-peaked elections, but becomes NP-complete in 3-peaked elections for every constant r ≥ 4. If
r is not a constant, we show that control by adding votes for r-Approval already becomes NP-complete in
2-peaked elections. In addition, we prove that control by deleting votes for r-Approval is NP-complete in
2-peaked elections, even for every constant r ≥ 3.
Apart from the above results, we present some results for r-Approval control problems with respect to
their parameterized complexity. Recently, the parameterized complexity of various voting problems has
received a considerable amount of attention, see, e.g., [9, 15, 18, 35, 36, 38, 42, 45, 46, 50]. A parameterized
problem is a language L ⊆ Σ∗×N, where Σ is a finite alphabet. The first component is called the main part
and the second component is called the parameter of the problem. Downey and Fellows [16] established the
parameterized complexity hierarchy:
FPT ⊆W[1] ⊆W[2] ⊆ · · · ⊆ XP,
where the class FPT (stands for “fixed-parameter tractable”) includes all parameterized problems which
admit O(f(κ) · |I|O(1))-time algorithms, where I is the main part, |I| is the size of I, κ is the parameter and
f can be any computable function. Such algorithms are called FPT-algorithms. For a positive integer i, a
parameterized problem is W[i]-hard if all problems in W[i] are FPT-reducible to the problem. It is widely
believed that W[i]-hard problems where i ≥ 1 do not admit FPT-algorithms (otherwise the parameterized
complexity hierarchy collapses). Hence, W[i]-hard problems are referred to as fixed-parameter intractable
problems in the literature.
Given two parameterized problems Q and Q′, an FPT-reduction from Q to Q′ is an algorithm that takes
as input an instance (I, κ) of Q and outputs an instance (I ′, κ′) of Q′ such that
(1) the algorithm runs in f(κ) · |I|O(1) time, where f is a computable function;
(2) (I, κ) ∈ Q if and only if (I ′, κ′) ∈ Q′; and
(3) κ′ ≤ g(κ), where g is a computable function.
Liu et al. [35] proved that control by adding votes for Approval is W[1]-hard and control by deleting
votes for Approval is W[2]-hard, with the number of added and deleted votes as parameters, respectively.
In addition, Liu et al. [35] proved that control by adding candidates for 1-Approval is W[2]-hard, with
the number of added candidates as the parameter. Betzler and Uhlmann [4] complemented these results
by proving that control by deleting candidates for 1-Approval is W[2]-hard, with the number of deleted
candidates as the parameter. The W[2]-hardness reductions of control by adding/deleting candidates for
1-Approval in [35] and [4] can be extended to r-Approval for every constant r ≥ 2. In this paper, we prove
that control by deleting candidates for 1-Approval restricted to 3-peaked elections is W[1]-hard with the
number of deleted candidates as the parameter. Regarding general elections (the domain of preferences is
not restricted), we prove that for constant r, control by adding/deleting votes for r-Approval is FPT with
respect to the number of added/deleted votes.
Along the way establishing our results described above, we obtain two byproducts which are of indepen-
dent interest. First, to show the NP-completeness of control by deleting votes for r-Approval in 2-peaked
elections, we study a property of graphs of maximum degree 3 (Lemma 4). By and large, we prove that every
graph of maximum degree 3 has a 2-interval representation (a 2-interval is a set consisting of two intervals
over the real line) where every 2-interval contains one trivial interval and, moreover, every two 2-intervals
may only intersect at their endpoints. Since many graph problems, such as the Vertex Cover problem,
the Hamiltonian Cycle problem and the Dominating Set problem, remain NP-hard when restricted
to graphs of maximum degree 3 [29, 30, 39], this property may be useful in developing algorithms for these
problems, or proving NP-hardness of further problems restricted to graphs of maximum degree 3. Second,
to show the fixed-parameter tractability of control by adding votes for r-Approval in general elections, we
derive an FPT-algorithm for a generalization of the NP-hard problem r-Set Packing, in which given a
universal set X and a collection U of r-subsets of X where r is a constant, one asks for a subcollection of
size k such that no two r-subsets in the subcollection intersect. In the generalization, we allow each element
x ∈ X to occur in at most f(x) many r-subsets of the desired subcollection, where f is a given mapping
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from X to positive integers. Thus, if f(x) = 1 for every x ∈ X, we have the r-Set Packing problem. Jia,
Zhang and Chen [32] crafted an ingenious FPT-algorithm for the r-Set Packing problem, with respect to
k . Based on this FPT-algorithm, we devise an FPT-algorithm for the generalized r-Set Packing problem,
with respect to k .
2. PRELIMINARIES
We will need the following notations. Unless stated otherwise, all numerical data are integers.
Multisets. A multiset S = {s1, s2, . . . , s|S|} is a generalization of a set where objects are allowed to
appear more than once, that is, si = sj is allowed for i 6= j. An element of S is one copy of some object. We
use s ∈+ S to denote that s is an element of S. The size of S, denoted by |S|, is the number of elements in S.
For instance, the size of the multiset {1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 4} is 7. For two multisets A and B, we use AunionmultiB to denote
the multiset containing all elements from A and B, and use A 	 B to denote the multiset containing, for
each object s of A, max{0, n1−n2} copies of s, where n1 and n2 denote the numbers of copies of s in A and
B, respectively. For example, for A = {1, 1, 1, 2, 3, 3, 4} and B = {1, 2, 3}, A unionmulti B = {1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 4}
and A 	 B = {1, 1, 3, 4}. A multiset B is a submultiset of a multiset A if for every object s that occurs n
times in B, A contains at least n copies of s. We use B v A to denote that B is a submultiset of A.
r-Approval. Let C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} be a set of m candidates and V a set of voters where every v ∈ V
casts a vote piv defined as a linear order over C. For a vote piv defined as a linear order (cβ(1), . . . , cβ(m)),
piv(cβ(i)) denotes the position of the candidate cβ(i) in piv, i.e., piv(cβ(i)) = i, where β is a permutation of
{1, 2, . . . ,m}, i.e., {β(1), . . . , β(m)} = {1, . . . ,m}. The multiset of votes cast by voters in V is denoted by
ΠV . The tuple (C,ΠV) is called an election. In r-Approval, each voter v gives to each candidate c one point
if piv(c) ≤ r, and zero points otherwise. For a vote piv, let 1(v) denote the set of candidates who get one point
and 0(v) the set of candidates who get zero points from piv, i.e., 1(v) = {c ∈ C | piv(c) ≤ r} and 0(v) = C\1(v).
For a candidate c, let SCV(c) be the total score of c from ΠV , i.e., SCV(c) = |{piv ∈+ ΠV | c ∈ 1(v)}|.
Candidates with the highest total score are called the winners of (C,ΠV) with respect to r-Approval. If
there is only one winner, we call it the unique winner; otherwise, we call them cowinners.
For a vote piv and a subset C ⊆ C, let piv(C) be the partial vote of piv restricted to C such that in piv(C)
the relative order between every two distinct candidates in C preserves the same as in piv. For example, for
piv = (a, b, c, d, e), we have piv({b, d, e}) = (b, d, e). For a multiset Π of votes and a subset C ⊆ C, let Π(C)
be the multiset obtained from Π by replacing each pi ∈+ Π by pi(C).
Single-peaked/k -peaked elections. An election (C,ΠV) is single-peaked if there is an order L of C
such that for every vote piv ∈+ ΠV and every three candidates a, b, c ∈ C with a L b L c or c L b L a,
piv(c) < piv(b) implies piv(b) < piv(a), where a L b means that a is ordered on the left-side of b in L. The
candidate c such that piv(c) = 1 is the peak of piv with respect to L.
For an order L = (c1, c2, . . . , cm) of C and a vote piv, we say that piv is k -peaked with respect to L if there
is a k ′-partition L1 = (c1, . . . , ci1), L2 = (ci1+1, . . . , ci2), . . . , Lk ′ = (cik ′−1+1, . . . , cm) of L such that k ′ ≤ k
and piv(C(Lx)) is single-peaked with respect to Lx for all 1 ≤ x ≤ k ′, where C(Lx) is the set of candidates
appearing in Lx. See Figure 2 for an example.
An election is k -peaked if there is an order L of C such that every vote in the election is k -peaked with
respect to L. Here L is called a k -harmonious order of the election. Thus, 1-peaked elections are exactly
single-peaked elections. Moreover, every election of m candidates is an dm/2e-peaked election.
Problem definitions. The problems studied in this paper are defined as follows. Throughout this
paper, let p denote the distinguished candidate.
r-Approval Control by Adding Votes in k -Peaked Elections (r-AV-k )
Input: An election (C,ΠV), a distinguished candidate p ∈ C, a multiset ΠT of unregistered votes, a k -
harmonious order L such that all votes in ΠV and all votes in ΠT are k -peaked with respect to L,
and an integer 0 ≤ R ≤ |ΠT |.
Question: Is there a ΠT ′ v ΠT such that |ΠT ′ | ≤ R and p wins (C,ΠV unionmultiΠT ′) with respect to r-Approval?
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Figure 2: This figure shows a 2-peaked vote piv = (c3, c4, c7, c6, c8, c9, c5, c2, c10, c1) with respect to the 2-harmonious order
L = (c1, c2, . . . , c10). Here, L is partitioned into L1 = (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5) and L2 = (c6, c7, c8, c9, c10).
r-Approval Control by Deleting Votes in k -Peaked Elections (r-DV-k )
Input: An election (C,ΠV), a distinguished candidate p ∈ C, a k -harmonious order L such that all votes
in ΠV are k -peaked with respect to L, and an integer 0 ≤ R ≤ |ΠV |.
Question: Is there a ΠT v ΠV such that |ΠT | ≤ R and p wins (C,ΠV 	ΠT ) with respect to r-Approval?
r-Approval Control by Deleting Candidates in k -Peaked Elections (r-DC-k )
Input: An election (C,ΠV), a distinguished candidate p ∈ C, a k -harmonious order L such that all votes
in ΠV are k -peaked with respect to L, and an integer 0 ≤ R ≤ |C| − 1.
Question: Is there a C ⊆ C \ {p} such that |C| ≤ R and p wins (C \C,ΠV(C \C)) with respect to r-Approval?
We use r-AV, r-DV and r-DC to denote the above problems without the k -peakedness restriction (i.e.,
there is no k -harmonious order in the input), respectively. Following the convention, for each of the above
problems, we distinguish between the unique-winner model and the nonunique-winner model, where in the
unique-winner model winning an election means to be the unique winner, while in the nonunique-winner
model winning an election means to be a winner, i.e., either the unique winner or a cowinner.
Remarks. All our results apply to both the unique-winner model and the nonunique-winner model.
For the sake of clarity, our proofs are solely based on the unique-winner model. However, the result for the
nonunique-winner model of a problem can be obtained by slightly modifying the proof for the unique-winner
model of the same problem. All our NP-completeness results work for Approval and SP-AV as well.
3. 2-Peaked Elections
In this section, we study r-Approval control problems restricted to 2-peaked elections. The following
three theorems summarize our findings.
Theorem 1. r-AV-2 is polynomial-time solvable for every constant r.
Recall that r-AV is NP-complete for every constant r ≥ 4 but polynomial-time solvable when restricted
to single-peaked elections [23]. Theorem 1 shows that the polynomial-time solvability of r-AV remains when
extending from single-peaked elections to 2-peaked elections, for r being a constant. This bound is tight as
indicated by the following theorem. More precisely, if r is not a constant, r-AV becomes NP-complete in 2-
peaked elections, in contrast to the polynomial-time solvability of the problem in single-peaked elections [23].
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Figure 3: This figure shows two votes piv = (c3, c4, c7, c6, c8, c9, c5, c2, c10, c1) and piu = (c7, c6, c5, c8, c9, c10, c1, c4, c3, c2). Each
vote gives one point to its top-4 candidates. 1(v) is represented by a 2-discrete interval {I1v = (c3, c4), I2v = (c6, c7)} and 1(u)
is represented by a 1-discrete interval {Iu = (c5, c6, c7, c8)}.
Theorem 2. r-AV-2 is NP-complete if r is a part of the input.
Faliszewski et al. [23] proved that r-DV-1 is polynomial-time solvable, even when r is not a constant.
The following theorem shows that by increasing the number of peaks only by one, this problem becomes
NP-complete for every constant r ≥ 3. Note that r-DV is polynomial-time solvable for r ≤ 2 [34].
Theorem 3. r-DV-2 is NP-complete for every constant r ≥ 3.
3.1. Proof of Theorem 1
We prove Theorem 1 by deriving a polynomial-time algorithm for r-AV-2 based on dynamic programming.
Recall that control by adding votes for r-Approval is polynomial-time solvable for r ≤ 3 even in general
elections. Hence, we need only to prove the theorem for every constant r ≥ 4. Let ((C,ΠV), p ∈ C,ΠT ,L, R)
be an instance of r-AV-2 where r ≥ 4. For c ∈ C, let ←−c (1) be the candidate lying immediately before c in L
and←−c (i) be the candidate lying immediately before←−c (i−1) in L. Similarly, we use −→c (1) and −→c (i) to denote
the candidates lying immediately after c and −→c (i− 1), respectively. For example, if L = (a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h),
then
−→
d (1) = e,
−→
d (4) = h,
←−
d (1) = c and
←−
d (3) = a.
Given an order A = (a1, a2, . . . , an), a discrete interval I over A is a sub-order (ai, . . . , ai+t) of A, where
0 ≤ t ≤ n−1 and 1 ≤ i ≤ n− t. We denote the left-most element ai by l(I) and the right-most element ai+t
by r(I). We also use A(l(I), r(I)) to denote I. Let S(I) denote the set of elements appearing in I and, for
notational simplicity, let |I| = |S(I)| be the size of I. For example, for a discrete interval I = A(3, 6) over
the order A = (2, 5, 3, 10, 4, 6, 0), S(I) is {3, 4, 6, 10}. A k-discrete interval over an order A is a collection of
k disjoint discrete intervals over A, where “disjoint” means that no element in A appears in more than one
of these discrete intervals. For a k-discrete interval I, let S(I) = ⋃I∈I S(I). The following observations are
useful.
Observation 1. For each k -peaked election (C,ΠV) associated with a k -harmonious order L over C, and
each vote piv ∈+ ΠV , there is a k ′-discrete interval I over L such that 0 < k ′ ≤ k and 1(v) = S(I).
By Observation 1, for every 2-peaked vote piv with respect to a 2-harmonious order L, 1(v) can be
represented by a 2-discrete interval or a 1-discrete interval over L. See Figure 3 for an example.
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Observation 2. Every Yes-instance of r-AV has a solution where each vote approves p.
We first derive a polynomial-time algorithm for 4-AV-2. It is easy to generalize the algorithm to r-AV-2
for every constant r ≥ 5. Due to Observation 2, we can safely assume that p ∈ 1(v) for each piv ∈+ ΠT . Due
to Observation 1, for every vote piv ∈+ ΠT , 1(v) can be represented by a 2-discrete interval Iv = {Ipv , Ipv},
where Ipv is the discrete interval including p and I
p¯
v is the discrete interval without p in it, or a 1-discrete
interval Iv = {Ipv} where p ∈ S(Ipv ). Let Π be the multiset of all votes piv ∈+ ΠT where 1(v) is represented by
a 1-discrete interval over L. We say that two votes have the same type if they approve the same candidates.
Since every voter approves exactly 4 candidates, Π has at most four different types of votes:
(1) votes approving ←−p (3),←−p (2),←−p (1), p;
(2) votes approving ←−p (2),←−p (1), p,−→p (1);
(3) votes approving ←−p (1), p,−→p (1),−→p (2); and
(4) votes approving p,−→p (1),−→p (2),−→p (3).
Then, we enumerate all possibilities of how many votes in a potential solution are from each of the four
types of votes in Π. For each possibility, we recalculate the scores of the candidates by incorporating the
corresponding votes into the election, and update R accordingly. We immediately discard all possibilities
leading to a negative value of R. In addition, after recalculating the scores we remove all unregistered
votes which can be represented by 1-discrete intervals. This breaks down the original instance into at most
R4 subinstances. It is clear that the original instance is a Yes-instance if and only if at least one of the
subinstances is a Yes-instance. In the following, we show how to solve each subinstance in polynomial time.
Let ΠT be the multiset of unregistered votes in the subinstance currently considered. As discussed above,
each vote in ΠT is represented by a 2-discrete interval. Let ~ΠT = (piv1 , piv2 , . . . , piv|T |) be an order of ΠT
such that r(Ipvi) = r(I
p
vj ) or r(I
p
vi) L r(Ipvj ) for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ |ΠT |. Our dynamic programming algorithm
uses a binary table
DT (i, j, s, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, si,1, si,2, si,3),
where i, j, s, s1, . . . , s6, si,1, si,2, si,3 are non-negative integers and DT (i, j, s, s1, . . . , s6, si,1, si,2, si,3) = 1 if
there is a submultiset ΠT ′ v {piv1 , piv2 , . . . , pivi} such that
(1) |ΠT ′ | = j;
(2) pivi ∈+ ΠT ′ ;
(3) max{SCV∪T ′(c) | c ∈ C \ {p}} = s;
(4) SCV∪T ′(ct) = st for all 1 ≤ t ≤ 6, where c3 =←−p (1), c2 =←−p (2), c1 =←−p (3), c4 = −→p (1), c5 = −→p (2) and
c6 =
−→p (3); and
(5) SCV∪T ′(ci,t) = si,t for all t ∈ {1, 2, 3}, where ci,1 = r(Ipvi), ci,2 =←−ci,1(1) and ci,3 =←−ci,1(2). See Figure 4
for an illustration of (4) and (5).
pci,1
si,2
ci,2
si,3
ci,3
si,1 s3
c3
s2
c2
s1
c1
s4
c4
s5
c5
s6
c6
I
p¯
vi I
p
vi
L
Figure 4: Illustration of (4) and (5) in the definition of the dynamic table DT in the proof of Theorem 1.
It is easy to see that the subinstance is a Yes-instance if and only if
DT (n,R′, s, s1, s2, . . . , s6, sn,1, sn,2, sn,3) = 1
for some n ≤ |ΠT |, R′ ≤ R, s ≤ SCV(p) + R′ − 1 and s′ ≤ s for all s′ ∈ {s1, s2, . . . , s6, sn,1, sn,2, sn,3}.
Therefore, to solve the subinstance we need to calculate the values of DT (i, j, s, s1, s2, . . . , s6, si,1, si,2, si,3)
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for all 0 ≤ j ≤ R, j ≤ i ≤ |ΠT |, 1 ≤ s ≤ SCV(p) +R− 1 and s′ ≤ s for all s′ ∈ {s1, . . . , s6, si,1, si,2, si,3}. As
a result, we have at most |T | ·R · (|V|+R)10 entries to calculate.
We use the following recurrence relation to update the table: DT (i, j, s, s1, . . . , s6, si,1, si,2, si,3) = 1 if at
least one of the following cases applies:
Case 1. ∃DT (i1, j − 1, s, s′1, s′2, . . . , s′6, s′i1,1, s′i1,2, s′i1,3) = 1 such that Conditions (1)-(4) hold.
Case 2. ∃s′ ∈ {s1, . . . , s6, si,1, . . . , si,3} with s′ = s and ∃DT (i1, j−1, s−1, s′1, . . . , s′6, s′i1,1, . . . , s′i1,3) = 1
such that Conditions (1)-(4) hold.
The four conditions are:
(1) j − 1 ≤ i1 ≤ i− 1;
(2) st = s
′
t + SC{vi}(ct) for all 1 ≤ t ≤ 6;
(3) si,t = s
′
i1,t1
+ SC{vi}(ci,t) for all ci,t = ci1,t1 ; and
(4) si,t = SCV∪{vi}(ci,t) for all ci,t ∈ {r(I p¯vi),
←−−−
r(I p¯vi)(1),
←−−−
r(I p¯vi)(2)} \ {r(I p¯vi1 ),
←−−−−
r(I p¯vi1 )(1),
←−−−−
r(I p¯vi1 )(2)}.
The above algorithm can be adapted to solve the nonunique-winner model: replacing all appearances of
“SCV(p) +R− 1” in the above description with “SCV(p) +R”.
The algorithm can be easily generalized to solve r-AV-2 for every constant r ≥ 4 by using a bigger but
still polynomial-sized table. In particular, for each fixed r, we need a 3r-dimensional table
DT (i, j, s, s1, . . . , s2(r−1), si,1, . . . , si,r−1),
where i, j, s take the same meanings as in the above algorithm, s1, . . . , s2(r−1) maintain the scores of the
2(r − 1) candidates around the distinguished candidate p (precisely, we maintain the scores of the r − 1
candidates immediately lying on the left side of p, and the scores of the r− 1 candidates immediately lying
on the right side of p in the 2-harmonious order. If there are less than r− 1 candidates lying on the left- or
right-side of p, we reduce the dimension of the table accordingly), and si,1, . . . , si,r−1 maintain the scores of
the candidate r(Ipvi) and the r−2 candidates consecutively lying on the left side of r(Ipvi) in the 2-harmonious
order.
3.2. Proof of Theorem 2
We prove Theorem 2 by a reduction from a variant of the Independent Set problem which is NP-
hard [33]. It is clear that r-AV-2 is in NP. It remains to prove the NP-hardness.
Let ( ) denote an empty order containing no element. For a linear order A = (a1, a2, . . . , an), let A[ai, aj ]
(resp. A(ai, aj ], A[ai, aj) and A(ai, aj)) with 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n be the sub-order (ai, ai+1, . . . , aj) (resp.
(ai+1, ai+2, . . . , aj) if i < j and ( ) if i = j, (ai, ai+1, . . . , aj−1) if i < j and ( ) if i = j, and (ai+1, ai+2, . . . , aj−1)
if i < j − 1 and ( ) if j ≥ i ≥ j − 1), and let A[aj , ai] (resp. A[aj , ai), A(aj , ai] and A(aj , ai)) be the re-
versal of A[ai, aj ] (resp. A(ai, aj ], A[ai, aj) and A(ai, aj)). For two linear orders A = (a1, a2, . . . , an) and
B = (b1, b2, . . . , bm) without common elements, let (A,B) be the linear order (a1, a2, . . . , an, b1, b2, . . . , bm).
Let [n] be the set {1, 2, . . . , n}.
A Variant of Independent Set (VIS)
Input: A multiset T = {T1, T2, . . . , Tn} where each Ti ∈+ T is a set of discrete intervals of size
4 over (1, 2, . . . , 12n) and |Ti| ≤ 3 for all Ti ∈+ T .
Question: Is there a set S ⊆ ⋃T∈+T T of discrete intervals such that |S| = n, |S ∩ Ti| = 1 for
every Ti ∈+ T and no two discrete intervals in S intersect?
Given an instance E = (T = {T1, T2, . . . , Tn}) of VIS, we construct an instance E ′ = ((C,ΠV), p ∈
C,ΠT ,L, R = n) for r-AV-2 as follows.
Let I = ⋃T∈+T T . Let Γ be the set of all elements appearing in some discrete interval of I, i.e.,
Γ =
⋃
I∈I S(I). Let ~Γ = (x1, x2, . . . , x|Γ|) be the order of Γ such that xi < xi+1 for all i ∈ [|Γ| − 1].
Candidates: We create three disjoint subsets of candidates C, D and E as follows: (1) C = Γ; (2) D
contains exactly 2n− 1 candidates denoted by d1, . . . , dn, . . . , d2n−1; (3) E contains exactly (n+ 3) · (|C|+
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|D| − 1) dummy candidates denoted by x′1, x′2, . . . , x′|C|·(n+3), d′1, d′2, . . . , d′(n+3)·(|D|−1) which can never be
winners no matter which up to R unregistered votes are added. Hence, C = C ∪D ∪ E. The distinguished
candidate is dn, i.e., p = dn. Moreover, r = n+ 4.
2-Harmonious Order: Let ~D = (d1, d2, . . . , d2n−1) and ~E = (x′1, . . . , x
′
|C|·(n+3), d
′
1, . . . , d
′
(|D|−1)·(n+3)).
Then, the 2-harmonious order L is (~Γ, ~D, ~E).
Registered Votes ΠV : We create the following registered votes:
(1) for each xi ∈ C, create n− 2 votes defined as
(xi,L[x′(n+3)i−n−2, x′i(n+3)],L(xi, x1],L(xi, x′(n+3)i−n−2),L(x′i(n+3), d′(|D|−1)·(n+3)]);
(2) for each di ∈ D where i ∈ [n− 1], create n− (i+ 1) votes defined as
(di,L[d′(n+3)i−n−2, d′i(n+3)],L(di, x1],L(di, d′(n+3)i−n−2),L(d′i(n+3), d′(|D|−1)·(n+3)]);
(3) for each di ∈ D where i ∈ {n+ 1, n+ 2, . . . , 2n− 1}, create i− (n+ 1) votes defined as
(di,L[d′(n+3)i−2n−5, d′(i−1)·(n+3)],L(di, x1],L(di, d′(n+3)i−2n−5),L(d′(i−1)·(n+3), d′(|D|−1)·(n+3)]).
Unregistered Votes ΠT : For each Iij ∈ Ti ∈+ T , create a corresponding unregistered vote which
is defined as (L[l(Iij), r(Iij)],L[di, d′(|D|−1)·(n+3)],L(l(Iij), x1],L(r(Iij), di−1]). Clearly, this vote approves
exactly the four candidates between l(Iij) and r(Iij) (including l(Iij) and r(Iij)), and all candidates between
di and di+n−1 (including di and di+n−1) in L. Thus, every unregistered vote approves the distinguished
candidate dn.
It is clear that all votes constructed above are 2-peaked with respect to L. Due to the construction, it
is easy to see that SCV(c) = n − 2 for all c ∈ C, SCV(di) = n − i − 1 for all di ∈ D where i ∈ [n − 1],
SCV(di) = i− n− 1 for all di ∈ D where i ∈ {n+ 1, n+ 2, . . . , 2n− 1}, SCV(c) ≤ n− 2 for all c ∈ E, and
SCV(dn) = 0.
Now we prove that E is a Yes-instance if and only if E ′ is a Yes-instance.
(⇒:) Suppose that E is a Yes-instance and let S be a solution of E . Let ~S = (I1, I2, . . . , In) be the order
of S where Ii = S ∩ Ti for all i ∈ [n]. Then, we can make dn the unique winner by adding votes from ΠT
according to S. More specifically, for each Ii ∈ S we add its corresponding vote constructed above to the
election. Clearly, the final score of dn is n. Due to the construction, no two added votes piv and piu which
correspond to two different intervals Ii and Ij , respectively, approve a common candidate from C. Thus,
after adding these votes, no candidate in C has a higher score than that of dn. To analyze the score of
dj ∈ D with j ∈ [n− 1], observe that for any i > j the vote corresponding to Ii does not approve dj . Since
SCV(dj) = n− j − 1 and |S ∩ Ti| = 1 for all i ∈ [j], the final score of dj is less than n. Similarly, to analyze
the score of dj ∈ D with j ∈ {n+ 1, n+ 2, . . . , 2n−1}, observe that for any i ≤ j−n the vote corresponding
to Ii does not approve dj . Since SCV(dj) = j−n− 1 and |S ∩Ti| = 1 for all i ∈ {j−n+ 1, j−n+ 2, . . . , n},
the final score of dj is less than n. The final score of each c ∈ E is clearly at most n−2 since no unregistered
vote approves c. To summarize the above analysis, we conclude that the distinguished candidate dn becomes
the unique winner after adding the votes discussed above.
(⇐:) Suppose that E ′ is a Yes-instance and S′ is a multiset of votes chosen from ΠT such that dn uniquely
wins (C,ΠV unionmulti S′). It is easy to verify that |S′| = n, since otherwise at least one of C would be a winner.
Thus, the final score of dn is n and every c ∈ C can get at most one point from S′. Therefore, no two votes
in S′ approve a common candidate of C, implying that S′ must be a set. This also means that the intervals
corresponding to S′ do not intersect. Let P1, P2, . . . , Pn be a partition of ΠT where Pi contains all votes
corresponding to the intervals of Ti ∈+ T . Clearly, Pi is a set. We claim that |S′ ∩Pi| = 1 for every i ∈ [n].
Suppose this is not true, then there must be a certain Pi with |S′∩Pi| ≥ 2. Let S1 = S′∩Pi (thus, |S1| ≥ 2),
S2 = {piv ∈ S′ ∩ Pi′ | i′ < i} and S3 = {piv ∈ S′ ∩ Pi′ | i′ > i}. It is clear that |S1|+ |S2|+ |S3| = n. Since
all votes in S1 approve both di and di+n−1, all votes in S2 approve di but do not approve di+n−1, and all
votes in S3 approve di+n−1 but do not approve di, it holds that
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SCVunionmultiS′(di) + SCVunionmultiS′(di+n−1)
= SCV(di) + |S1|+ |S2|+ SCV(di+n−1) + |S1|+ |S3|
= n− i− 1 + |S1|+ |S2|+ i− 2 + |S1|+ |S3|
= 2n− 3 + |S1|
≥ 2n− 1
As a result, at least one of di and di+n−1 has final score at least n, contradicting that dn is the unique
winner. The claim then follows. It is now easy to see that the discrete intervals corresponding to S′ form a
solution of E .
The NP-hardness reduction for the nonunique-winner model is similar to the above reduction, with only
the difference in the construction of the registered votes. In particular, we need to construct the registered
votes so that the score of each candidate c ∈ C ∪D is exactly one point greater than that of c in the above
construction. This can be done as follows:
(1) for each xi ∈ C, create n− 1 votes defined as
(xi,L[x′(n+3)i−n−2, x′i(n+3)],L(xi, x1],L(xi, x′(n+3)i−n−2),L(x′i(n+3), d′(|D|−1)·(n+3)]);
(2) for each di ∈ D where i ∈ [n− 1], create n− i votes defined as
(di,L[d′(n+3)i−n−2, d′i(n+3)],L(di, x1],L(di, d′(n+3)i−n−2),L(d′i(n+3), d′(|D|−1)·(n+3)]);
(3) for each di ∈ D where i ∈ {n+ 1, n+ 2, . . . , 2n− 1}, create i− n votes defined as
(di,L[d′(n+3)i−2n−5, d′(i−1)·(n+3)],L(di, x1],L(di, d′(n+3)i−2n−5),L(d′(i−1)·(n+3), d′(|D|−1)·(n+3)]).
3.3. Proof of Theorem 3
It is clear that r-DV-2 is in NP. It remains to prove the NP-hardness. We first prove that 3-DV-2
is NP-hard by a reduction from the Vertex Cover problem on graphs of maximum degree 3 which is
NP-hard [28]. Then, we will show that the proof applies to r-DV-2 for every constant r ≥ 4 with a slight
modification.
A graph is a tuple G = (V,E) where V is the set of vertices and E is the set of edges. We also use
V (G) to denote the vertex set of G. For a vertex u ∈ V , NG(u) denotes the set of its neighbors in G, i.e.,
NG(u) = {w | (w, u) ∈ E}. The degree of a vertex is the number of its neighbors. A vertex of degree
i is called a degree-i vertex. A graph is of maximum degree 3 if every vertex has degree at most 3. An
independent set of a graph G = (V,E) is a subset S ⊆ V such that there is no edge between every two
vertices in S. Meanwhile, the complement V \ S is called a vertex cover of G.
Vertex Cover on Graphs of Maximum Degree 3 (VC3)
Input: A graph G = (V,E) of maximum degree 3 and a positive integer κ.
Question: Does G have a vertex cover of size at most κ?
To prove the NP-hardness of 3-DV-2, we first study a property of graphs of maximum degree 3. This
property may be of independent interest since many graph problems are NP-hard when restricted to graphs
of maximum degree 3 (see e.g., [29, 30, 39]).
An interval over the real line is a closed set [a, b] = {x ∈ R | a ≤ x ≤ b} where a and b are real numbers.
An interval is trivial if a = b. For an interval I = [a, b], l(I) denotes its left-endpoint a, and r(I) denotes
its right-endpoint b. A t-interval is a set of t intervals over the real line. A t≤-interval is a t′-interval for
some t′ ≤ t. A graph G = (V,E) is a t-interval graph if there is a set I(G) of t≤-intervals and a bijection
f : V → I(G) such that for every u,w ∈ V , (u,w) ∈ E if and only if f(u) and f(w) intersect. Here, I(G)
is called a t-interval representation of G. For simplicity, we use Iu(G) = {I1u, I2u, . . . , It
′
u } to denote f(u),
where each Iiu ∈ Iu(G) is an interval and t′ ≤ t. Moreover, when it is clear from the context, we write Iu
for Iu(G). For two real numbers a and b with a ≤ b, we define (a, b) = {x ∈ R | a < x < b}.
The following lemma states that every graph of maximum degree 3 has a 2-interval representation such
that every vertex is represented by a 2-interval where one interval is trivial and, moreover, 2-intervals may
only intersect at the endpoints.
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Lemma 4. For every graph G of maximum degree 3 there is a 2-interval representation such that for every
u ∈ V (G), Iu = {I1u, I2u} and one of the following conditions holds:
(1) I1u = [x1, x1], I
2
u = [x2, x3], x1 < x2 < x3 and @u′ ∈ V (G)\{u} such that r(I(u′)) ∈ (x2, x3) or l(I(u′)) ∈
(x2, x3);
(2) I1u = [x1, x2], I
2
u = [x3, x3], x1 < x2 < x3 and @u′ ∈ V (G) \ {u} such that r(I(u′)) ∈ (x1, x2) or
l(I(u′)) ∈ (x1, x2), for some I(u′) ∈ {I1u′ , I2u′}.
Moreover, such a 2-interval representation can be found in polynomial time. See Figure 5 for an example.
real line
u3
u1
u2
u4
u1
u2 u3 u4
Figure 5: The figure on the left-side illustrates a 2-interval representation of the graph on the right-side.
The proof of Lemma 4 is deferred to the appendix. We now show the reduction. Let E = (G, κ) be an
instance of VC3 and I(G) be a 2-interval representation of G as stated in Lemma 4. For every Iu = {I1u, I2u},
let D(u) be the set of the endpoints of I1u and I
2
u (due to Lemma 4, |D(u)| = 3 for all u ∈ V (G)), and let
Γ =
⋃
u∈V (G)D(u). Let ~Γ = (x1, x2, . . . , x|Γ|) be the order of Γ with xi < xi+1 for all i ∈ [|Γ| − 1]. We
construct an instance E ′ = ((C,ΠV), p ∈ C,L, R = κ) of 3-DV-2 as follows.
Candidates: C = Γ∪{p, c1, c2, c3, c4} with c1, c2, c3, c4 being dummy candidates, which would never be
winners no matter which up to R votes are deleted. Here, {p, c1, . . . , c4} is disjoint with Γ.
2-Harmonious Order: L = (~Γ, p, c1, c2, c3, c4).
Votes: We create in total |V (G)|+ 2 votes. First, we create |V (G)| votes each of which corresponds to
an Iu in I(G) for u ∈ V (G). In particular, for every Iu where u ∈ V (G), we create a vote
piu = (xi, xj , xk,L(xi, x1],L(xi, xj),L(xj , xk),L(xk, c4]),
where (xi, xj , xk) is the order of D(u) such that xi < xj < xk. Apparently, piu approves all candidates in
D(u) and disapproves p. Due to Lemma 4, either xi or xk lies consecutively with xj in L, which implies
that piu is 2-peaked with respect to L. Let Π(G) be the multiset of the above |V (G)| votes. Second, we
create two further votes defined as (p, c1, c2, c3, c4,L(p, x1]) and (p, c3, c4, c1, c2,L(p, x1]), respectively. It is
clear that these two votes are 2-peaked with respect to L.
In the following, we prove that E is a Yes-instance if and only if E ′ is a Yes-instance.
(⇒:) Suppose that E is a Yes-instance and S is a vertex cover of size at most κ of G. Then, we delete all
votes in {piu | u ∈ S}. After deleting these votes, no two votes of Π(G) approve a common candidate in C,
since otherwise V (G) \ S could not be an independent set, contradicting the fact that S is a vertex cover.
Thus, after deleting these votes all candidates except for p have only one point. Since p has two points, p is
the unique winner.
(⇐:) Suppose that E ′ is a Yes-instance. Then E ′ has a solution containing only votes disapproving p.
Let S′ be such a solution of size at most κ. Therefore, p has two points in the election after deleting all
votes in S′. It follows that every other candidate has at most one point after deleting all votes of S′. As
a result, no two votes of Π(G) approve a common candidate in C in the final election, implying that the
vertices corresponding to S′ form a vertex cover of G.
In order to prove that r-DV-2 is NP-hard for a constant r ≥ 4, we need to modify the proof slightly.
First, we add some dummy candidates. More specifically, for every u ∈ V (G) such that [xi, xi+1] ∈ Iu where
1 ≤ i ≤ |Γ| − 1, we create r − 3 dummy candidates and put them between xi ∈ Γ and xi+1 ∈ Γ in L (the
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relative order of these dummy candidates in L does not matter). Besides, we have 2r−6 dummy candidates
c5, c6, . . . , c2r−2 lying after c4 in L, with the order (c5, c6, . . . , c2r−2). Thus, there are (r − 3) · |V (G)|+2r−6
new dummy candidates in total. We change the votes in Π(G) as follows: for every u ∈ V (G) with
Iu = {[xi, xi+1], [xj , xj ]}, i + 1 < j (resp. Iu = {[xi, xi], [xj , xj+1]}, i < j), we create a vote defined as
(L[xi, xi+1], xj ,L(xi, x1],L(xi+1, xj),L(xj , c2r−2]) (resp. (xi,L[xj , xj+1],L(xi, x1],L(xi, xj),L(xj+1, c2r−2])).
As for the last two created votes, we replace them with the two votes defined as (L[p, c2r−2],L(p, x1]) and
(p,L[cr, c2r−2],L[c1, cr),L(p, x1]), respectively. Then, with the same argument, we can show that r-DV-2 is
NP-hard.
To prove the NP-hardness of the nonunique-winner model of r-DV-2 for every constant r ≥ 3, we adapt
the above reductions slightly. In particular, we keep all votes in Π(G) and the second-last vote created
above, but discard the last vote created above (so that the score of the distinguished candidate p is 1 in the
given election). Other parts remain unchanged.
4. 3-Peaked Elections
In Section 2, we proved that for every constant r control by adding votes for r-Approval is polynomial-
time solvable when restricted to 2-peaked elections. In this section, we show that the tractability of the
problem does not hold when extended to 3-peaked elections, even when r is a small constant.
Theorem 5. r-AV-3 is NP-complete for every constant r ≥ 4.
Proof. It is clear that r-AV-3 is in NP. It remains to prove the NP-hardness of the problem. We
first prove the NP-hardness of 4-AV-3 by a reduction from the Independent Set problem on graphs of
maximum degree 3 which is NP-hard [28].
Independent Set on Graphs of Maximum Degree 3 (IS3)
Input: A graph G = (V,E) of maximum degree 3 and a positive integer κ.
Question: Does G have an independent set containing exactly κ vertices?
For an instance E = (G, κ) of IS3, let I(G) be a 2-interval representation of G which satisfies all
conditions stated in Lemma 4. Let D(u),Γ and ~Γ be defined as in Subsect. 3.3. We construct an instance
E ′ = ((C,ΠV), p ∈ C,ΠT ,L, R = κ) of 4-AV-3 as follows.
Candidates: C = Γ ∪ {p, c1, c2, c3}, where {p, c1, c2, c3} is disjoint from Γ.
3-Harmonious Order: L = (~Γ, p, c1, c2, c3).
Registered Votes ΠV : The role of registered votes is to ensure that all candidates of Γ have the
same score κ − 2. To this end, we first create κ − 2 votes defined as (L[xi, xi+3],L(xi, x1],L(xi+3, c3]) for
every i = 1, 5, . . . , 4b|Γ|/4c − 3. Then, we create some further votes according to |Γ|. Case 1. |Γ| ≡ 0
mod 4. We create no further vote. Case 2. |Γ| ≡ 1 mod 4. We create additional κ − 2 votes defined
as (x|Γ|,L[c1, c3],L(x|Γ|, x1], p). Case 3. |Γ| ≡ 2 mod 4. We create additional κ − 2 votes defined as
(x|Γ|−1, x|Γ|, c1, c2,L(x|Γ|−1, x1], p, c3). Case 4. |Γ| ≡ 3 mod 4. We create additional κ− 2 votes defined as
(L[x|Γ|−2, x|Γ|], c1,L(x|Γ|−2, x1], p, c2, c3).
Unregistered Votes ΠT : For each u ∈ V (G), let (xi, xj , xk) be the order of D(u) with xi < xj <
xk. We create a vote piu = (xi, xj , xk, p,L(xi, x1],L(xi, xj),L(xj , xk),L(xk, p),L(p, c3]). Due to Lemma 4,
either xi or xk lies consecutively with xj in L; thus, in the worst case piu has 3 peaks xα, xβ and p where
{xα, xβ} ⊆ {xi, xj , xk} ({xα, xβ} depends on whether xj lies consecutively with xi or with xk), with respect
to L.
In the following, we prove that E is a Yes-instance if and only if E ′ is a Yes-instance. It is easy to see
that SCV(x) = κ− 2 for all x ∈ C \ {p, c1, c2, c3}, SCV(p) = 0 and SCV(c) ≤ κ− 2 for all c ∈ {c1, c2, c3}.
(⇒:) Suppose that E is a Yes-instance and S is an independent set of size κ. Then we add all votes
corresponding to S, i.e., all votes in {piu | u ∈ S}, to the election. Since S is an independent set, no two
added votes approve a common candidate except p; thus, each candidate except p has a final score at most
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κ− 1. Since each added vote approves p, it follows that p has a final score κ, implying that p becomes the
unique winner after adding these votes.
(⇐:) Suppose that E ′ is a Yes-instance and S′ is a solution. Clearly, p has a final score κ. Since p is the
unique winner, for every c ∈ C \ {p}, there is at most one vote in S′ approving c. Thus, no two votes in S′
approve a common candidate except p. Due to the construction, the vertices corresponding to S′ form an
independent set.
The proof applies to r-AV-3 for every constant r ≥ 5 by a similar modification as discussed in Subsect. 3.3.
To prove the NP-hardness of the nonunique-winner model of r-AV-3 for every r ≥ 4, we adapt the above
reductions so that every candidate in Γ has the same score κ − 1 other than κ − 2. This can be done by
replacing all appearances of “κ − 2” with “κ − 1” in the above reductions. The correctness argument is
similar. 
5. Parameterized Complexity
In this section, we study r-Approval control problems from the viewpoint of parameterized complexity.
The first two FPT results are for the general case, i.e., each registered and unregistered vote (if applicable)
is not necessarily k -peaked but can be defined as any linear order over the candidates.
Theorem 6. For every constant r, r-DV is FPT with respect to the number of deleted votes.
Proof. We derive an FPT-algorithm for r-DV to prove the theorem. Let E = ((C,ΠV), p ∈ C, R) be a
given instance. Let C1 = {c ∈ C \ {p} | SCV(c) ≥ SCV(p)} and ΠV1 = {piv ∈+ ΠV | C1 ∩ 1(v) 6= ∅}. That
is, ΠV1 contains all votes which approve at least one candidate having at least the same score as that of
p. Observe that every Yes-instance of r-DV has a solution S with S v ΠV1 . Hence, we can restrict our
attention to ΠV1 . Since at most R votes can be deleted and each vote approves at most r candidates in C1,
if E is a Yes-instance, it must be that |C1| ≤ r · R. So we assume that |C1| ≤ r · R; since otherwise we can
immediately conclude that E is a No-instance. We say that two votes have the same type if they approve the
same candidates in C1. Clearly, there are at most O((r ·R)r) = O(Rr) different types of votes in ΠV1 . Since
every solution includes at most R votes from each type of votes, we have at most
(
O(f(R))+R−1
R
)
= O(f(R)R)
cases to check where f(R) = Rr, implying an FPT-algorithm for r-DV with respect to R. 
Theorem 7. For every constant r, r-AV is FPT with respect to the number of added votes.
Proof. To prove the theorem, we reduce r-AV to a generalized r-Set Packing problem, and derive an
FPT-algorithm for this generalized r-Set Packing problem.
In the r-Set Packing problem, we are given a set X of elements, a multiset U of r-subsets of X and
an integer R ≥ 0, and the question is whether there is a subcollection T of U such that |T | = R and every
element in X occurs in at most one r-subset in T . Jia, Zhang and Chen [32] derived an ingenious FPT-
algorithm for the r-Set Packing problem for every constant r, with respect to R. The FPT-algorithm in [32]
resorts to the greedy localization technique, which has been proved useful in solving many parameterized
problems [10, 13, 24, 25, 37]. At a general level, the FPT-algorithm in [32] first greedily computes a maximal
collection of pairwise disjoint sets. If it is of size at least R, the instance is solved; otherwise, the maximal
collection must involve at most r ·R elements. Based on the observation that every set in a solution intersects
some set in the maximal collection, the algorithm enumerates all “potential” solutions iteratively, where each
iteration is based on a partial solution obtained via a “local extension” move from the previous iteration.
More importantly, the number of enumerated “potential” solutions in each iteration is bounded by a function
of the parameter (see [32] for further details).
Compared with the r-Set Packing problem, the generalized r-Set Packing problem allows every
element in X to occur in several r-subsets in the solution. Let N+ be the set of all positive integers. The
formal definition of the problem is as follows.
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Multi-r-Set Packing (MrSP)
Input: A universal set X, a multiset U of r-subsets of X where each x ∈ X occurs in at least
one r-subset, a mapping f : X → N+ with f(x) ≤ xU for every x ∈ X, where xU is the number
of occurrences of x in the r-subsets of U , and a positive integer R.
Question: Is there a submultiset T of U such that |T | = R and each x ∈ X occurs in at most
f(x) many r-subsets of T?
We adopt the same notation system as in [32]. We call a submultiset T of U an f -r-set packing if every
x ∈ X occurs in at most f(x) many r-subsets in T . An f -r-set packing T is maximal if after adding any set
from U 	T to T , some x ∈ X occurs in more than f(x) sets in T . A partial set σ∗ is a set in U with zero or
more elements in the set replaced by the symbol “∗”. A set without “∗” is also called a regular set. The set
consisting of the non-∗ elements in a partial set σ∗ is denoted as reg(σ∗). A partial set σ∗ is consistent with
a regular set σ if reg(σ∗) ⊆ σ. For an f -r-set packing T , let S(T ) be the set of objects contained in some
r-subset in T . For instance, for T = {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}, {2, 4, 6}, {6, 2, 1}}, S(T ) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 6}. We say
that an order (xa(1), xa(2), . . . , xa(t)), where xa(i) ∈ X for every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t} (it may be that xa(i) = xa(j)
for i 6= j), is valid if every x ∈ X occurs at most f(x) times in the order. For example, for X = {1, 4, 6},
f(1) = 2, f(4) = 1 and f(6) = 4, (1, 4, 1) is a valid order but (1, 4, 1, 6, 1) is not a valid order. A multiset T ′
of partial sets is valid if every x ∈ X occurs in at most f(x) partial sets in T ′.
Our algorithm is a natural generalization of the one for the r-Set Packing problem studied in [32]. The
main idea of our algorithm is as follows. We first find an arbitrary maximal f -r-set packing T0. This can
be done in polynomial time. If |T0| ≥ R, we are done. Otherwise, |S(T0)| ≤ r · R. Then, we try to extend
all possible valid multisets TR of the form {σ∗1 = {x1, ∗, . . . , ∗}, σ∗2 = {x2, ∗, . . . , ∗}, . . . , σ∗R = {xR, ∗, . . . , ∗}}
to a solution, where each xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ R, belongs to S(T0) (it may be that xi = xj for i 6= j). We make sure
that if the given instance is a Yes-instance, then at least one extension leads to a solution. When extending
a TR, we first make a copy QR of TR, which is used to find a subset of X such that, in the case that TR can
be extended to a solution, at least one element in the subset is included in a solution extended from TR.
This is done as follows: for each regular set in U , we check if there is a consistent partial set in QR such that
replacing the partial set with the regular set does not lead QR to be invalid. If this is the case, we replace
the partial set in QR with the regular set. If all partial sets of QR can be replaced by this way, we are done.
Otherwise, there is still a partial set σ∗ after the replacement. An observation is that if the current TR can
be extended to a solution, then in every solution the partial set σ∗ is extended to a regular set where one
of its elements is from S(QR). Due to this observation, we extend TR by enumerating all possibilities of the
element in S(QR) that is put in σ∗ in the solution. As the size of S(QR) is bounded by r · R, we have at
most r · R possibilities to consider. After each extension of TR, we reset QR = TR and continue to extend
TR analogously. The procedure terminates until we arrive at a solution or all possibilities are enumerated.
A formal description of the algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
The algorithm correctly solves the instance since it enumerates all potential solutions. To see that the
algorithm is an FPT-algorithm, one can consider the algorithm as a bounded search tree algorithm, where
each extension of a TR in the algorithm corresponds to a branching case. Since the size of S(QR) is bounded
by r · R, each node in the search tree has at most r · R children. Moreover, since each extension replaces
one ∗ in TR with an element in X and there are at most (r − 1) · R many ∗’s, the depth of the search tree
is bounded by (r − 1) · R. Finally, as there are at most (r · R)R many TR to extend, the whole algorithm
terminates in O∗((r ·R)(r−1)·R) ·O((r ·R)R) = O∗((r ·R)r·R) time.
Now let’s turn our attention back to r-AV. To solve r-AV in FPT-time, we develop a polynomial-time
reduction from r-AV to MrSP. Let E = ((C,ΠV), p ∈ C,ΠT , R) be an instance of r-AV. Let Πp v ΠT be the
multiset of all votes approving p in ΠT and Πp¯ = ΠT 	Πp. The following observations are clearly true.
Observation 3. If R > |Πp|, then E is a Yes-instance if and only if p wins the election (C,ΠV unionmultiΠp).
Due to the above observation, we can solve the problem in the case that R > |Πp|: if Πp is a solution
return “Yes”, otherwise, return “No”.
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Algorithm 1: An FPT-algorithm for MrSP
find an arbitrary maximal f -r-set packing T0 in polynomial time;
if |T0| ≥ R then
return Yes;
end
if there is no valid order (x1, x2, . . . , xR) over S(T0) then
return No;
/* The correctness of this step is based on the observation that each set in a
solution of a Yes-instance intersects S(T0): if this is not the case, then T0
cannot be a maximal f-r-set packing, since we can add the set in the solution
which does not intersect S(T0) to T0. */
end
foreach possible valid order (x1, x2, . . . , xR) over S(T0) do
let TR = {σ∗1 , σ∗2 , . . . , σ∗R}, where each partial set σ∗i , 1 ≤ i ≤ R, consists of the element xi and two
“∗”s;
return Extend(TR);
end
return No;
Observation 4. No solution of a Yes-instance contains an unregistered vote approving a candidate c ∈
C \ {p} such that SCV(c) ≥ SCV(p) +R− 1.
Observation 5. If R ≤ |Πp| and E is a Yes-instance, then there must be a solution containing exactly R
votes from Πp but none from Πp¯.
Let C ′ = {c ∈ C \{p} | SCV(c) ≥ SCV(p) +R−1}. Due to Observation 4, we can safely remove all votes
that approve some candidate in C ′ in ΠT . Based on Observation 5, we reduce E to an MrSP instance as
follows: the universal set is X = (C \ {p}) \C ′; the mapping f is defined as f(c) = SCV(p) +R−SCV(c)− 1
for every c ∈ X. Moreover, for every subset A ⊆ C \ C ′ such that there are exactly ` unregistered votes piv
such that 1(v) ∩ C ′ = ∅ and A ∪ {p} = 1(v), there are ` copies of A in the multiset U . 
Finally, we arrive at control by deleting candidates. Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra and Hemaspaandra [22]
proved that control by deleting candidates for 1-Approval is NP-complete when restricted to Swoon-SP
elections. Since Swoop-SP elections are a special case of 2-peaked elections, 1-DC-k where k ≥ 2 is NP-
complete. We strengthen the NP-completeness of 1-DC-3 by proving that the problem is W[1]-hard with
the number of deleted candidates as the parameter.
Theorem 8. 1-DC-3 is W[1]-hard with respect to the number of deleted candidates.
Proof. We prove the theorem by an FPT-reduction from the Independent Set problem which is
W[1]-hard [16]. For a linear order ~A = (a1, a2, . . . , an) over A = {a1, a2, . . . , an} and a subset B ⊆ A, denote
by ~A\B the linear order obtained from ~A by deleting all elements in B. For an instance E = (G = (V,E), κ)
of the Independent Set problem we construct an instance E ′ of 1-DC-3 as follows.
Candidates: V ∪ {p, a, a1, a2, . . . , aκ, b, b1, b2, . . . , bκ}, where {p, a, a1, . . . , aκ, b, b1, . . . , bκ} is disjoint
from V .
3-Harmonious Order: Let F = (c1, c2, . . . , cn) be an (arbitrary) order of V . Then, the 3-harmonious
order L is given by (bκ, bκ−1, . . . , b1, b, p, a, a1, a2, . . . , aκ, c1, c2, . . . , cn).
Votes: Let m = |E|. There are 7 submultisets of votes.
(1) 2m− 1 votes defined as (L[a, cn],L[p, bκ]);
(2) 2m votes defined as (L[p, cn],L[b, bκ]);
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Procedure Extend(TR)
QR = TR;
foreach r-subset σ in U do
if ∃σ∗ in QR with reg(σ∗) ⊆ σ and replacing σ∗ by σ does not make QR invalid then
QR = (QR 	 {σ∗} unionmulti {σ});
end
end
if QR contains no partial set then
return Yes;
end
if no σ∗ was replaced by some σ in the above foreach loop then
terminate the current procedure Extend();
end
pick an arbitrary partial set σ∗ in QR;
foreach c in S(QR) do
if replacing a “∗” in σ∗ by c gives a partial set which is consistent with at least one set in U and
TR 	 {σ∗} unionmulti {σ∗ 	 {∗} unionmulti {c}} is valid then
TR = TR 	 {σ∗} unionmulti {σ∗ 	 {∗} unionmulti {c}};
Extend(TR);
end
end
(3) 2m+ κ− 1 votes defined as (L[b, bκ],L[p, cn]);
(4) for each edge (ci, cj) ∈ E(G) with i < j, create one vote defined as (ci, cj ,L[a, aκ],L[p, bκ],F \{ci, cj});
(5) for each vertex ci, create one vote defined as (ci,L[p, aκ],L[b, bκ],F \ {ci}) and one vote defined as
(ci,L[a, aκ],L[p, bκ],F \ {ci});
(6) κ+ 1 votes defined as (L[a1, cn],L[a, bκ]);
(7) one vote defined as (L[b1, bκ],L[b, cn]).
It is easy to verify that all votes are 3-peaked with respect to L.
Number of Deleted Candidates: R = κ.
(⇐:) It is easy to verify that E is a Yes-instance implies E ′ is a Yes-instance: for every independent set
S of size κ, deleting all candidates in S from the election makes p the unique winner.
(⇒:) Suppose that E ′ is a Yes-instance and S′ is a solution with |S′| ≤ κ. Observe that b 6∈ S′, since
otherwise all candidates in {b1, b2, . . . , bκ} must be deleted to make p the unique winner, implying that
|S′| ≥ |{b, b1, . . . , bκ}| = κ + 1, a contradiction. The same argument applies to the candidate a. However,
in order to beat b, exactly κ candidates from V must be deleted so that p can get extra κ points from the
constructed votes in Case 5. Since |S′| ≤ κ, S′ must be a subset of V . Moreover, no two candidates in S′
are adjacent in the graph G, since otherwise the candidate a would get at least one extra point from the
constructed votes in Case 4, and p cannot be the unique winner. Thus, S′ is an independent set of G. 
6. Conclusion
k -peaked elections are a natural generalization of single-peaked elections where each vote is allowed to
have at most k peaks with respect to an order over the candidates. Hence, 1-peaked elections are exactly
single-peaked elections and dme2 -peaked elections are general elections, where m is the number of candidates.
We first studied the complexity of control by adding/deleting votes/candidates for r-Approval in k -peaked
elections and achieved both polynomial-time solvability results and NP-completeness results. Our study
leads to many dichotomy results for the problems considered in this paper, with respect to the values of
k and r. Then, we presented some results concerning the parameterized complexity of these problems in
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general elections as well as in k -peaked elections, with respect to the solution size. All our results hold for
both the unique-winner model and the nonunique-winner model. In addition, our NP-completeness results
apply to Approval and SP-AV as well. See Table 1 for a summary.
In an attempt to derive an NP-completeness result and an fixed-parameter tractability result, we obtained
two byproducts which are of independent interest. First, we proved that every graph of maximum degree
3 admits a 2-interval representation such that every 2-interval contains a trivial interval and, moreover,
every two 2-intervals may only intersect at their endpoints. Second, we presented an FPT-algorithm for a
generalized r-Set Packing problem, where each element in the given universal set is allowed to occur in
more than one r-subset in the solution.
A direction for future research would be to study various control problems for further voting systems in
k -peaked elections and other generalizations of single-peaked elections such as k-dimensional single-peaked
elections, k-swap single-peaked elections, etc. Very recently, Yang [47] proved that control by adding/deleting
votes for Borda in k -peaked elections is NP-complete even when k = 1 (i.e., single-peaked elections).
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Figure 6: This figure shows a 2-interval representation of the graph shown in Figure 5, obtained by turning over the 2-interval
representation shown in Figure 5. The left-most interval in the 2-interval representation shown in Figure 5 is a u3-interval. In
this figure, this u3-interval is the right-most interval.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4
To prove Lemma 4, we prove the following claim first. For a 2-interval representation I(G) of a 2-interval
graph G, and a vertex u ∈ V (G), we call intervals in Iu(G) u-intervals. An interval I is a left-most (resp.
right-most) interval if there is no other interval I ′ such that l(I ′) < l(I) (resp. r(I ′) > r(I)). For S ⊆ V (G),
let G \ S be the graph obtained from G by removing all vertices in S. For two graphs G = (V,E) and
G′ = (V ′, E′), let G ∪G′ be the graph (V ∪ V ′, E ∪ E′).
A path between two vertices v1, v2 in a graph is a sequence (v1, . . . , vt) of distinct vertices such that
there is an edge between every two consecutive vertices in the graph. A graph is connected if there is a
path between every pair of vertices. In addition, a graph with one vertex is also considered as connected. A
component of a graph G is a maximal connected induced subgraph of G. A cycle is a sequence (v1, . . . , vt)
of distinct vertices such that (v1, . . . , vt) is a path and there is an edge between v1 and vt.
Claim. Let G = (V,E) be a graph of maximum degree 3 and v be any arbitrary vertex in G. Then, there
is a 2-interval representation I(G, v) of G such that the following four conditions hold.
(1) the left-most intervals contain a v-interval;
(2) each degree-(≤ 1) vertex is represented by a trivial interval;
(3) each degree-2 vertex w is either represented by two trivial intervals, or by a closed interval [x1, x2] with
x1 < x2 such that the open interval (x1, x2) does not intersect any u-interval for all u ∈ V (G) \ {w};
(4) for each degree-3 vertex w ∈ V , Iw(G, v) = {I1w, I2w} is one of the following two cases:
(a) I1w = [x1, x1], I
2
w = [x2, x3], x1 < x2 < x3 and @u ∈ V (G)\{w} such that r(Iu) ∈ (x2, x3) or l(Iu) ∈
(x2, x3);
(b) I1w = [x1, x2], I
2
w = [x3, x3], x1 < x2 < x3 and @u ∈ V (G)\{w} such that r(Iu) ∈ (x1, x2) or l(Iu) ∈
(x1, x2),
where Iw(G, v) is the 2-interval corresponding to w in I(G, v) and Iu is a u-interval in I(G, v).
Proof. We prove the claim by induction on n = |V (G)|. The claim is clearly true for n = 1. Notice that
due to symmetry, if there is a 2-interval representation where the left-most intervals contain a v-interval,
then we can obtain a 2-interval representation where the right-most intervals contain a v-interval by turning
over the original 2-interval representation. See Figure 6 for an illustration. Suppose that the claim is true
for all graphs of maximum degree 3 with less than n vertices. Consider G to be a graph with n vertices.
Let v be a vertex in G as stated in the claim.
Consider first the case that v is a degree-3 vertex in G. Let NG(v) = {a, b, c}. We distinguish between
the following cases.
Case 1. v does not belong to any cycle in G.
Let Ca, Cb and Cc be the three components containing a, b and c in G \ {v}, respectively. By induction,
we know that Ca, Cb and Cc have 2-interval representations I(Ca, a), I(Cb, b) and I(Cc, c), respectively,
which satisfy all conditions stated in the above claim. Moreover, let G¯ = G \ ({v} ∪ V (Ca ∪Cb ∪Cc)) and *
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be any arbitrary vertex in G¯ if there are any. Let I(G¯, ∗) be a 2-interval representation of G¯ satisfying all
conditions stated in the claim (if G¯ has no vertex, we ignore I(G¯, ∗) in all figures below).
In the following, we show how to construct a 2-interval representation I(G, v) satisfying all conditions
stated in the above claim by creating intervals for v, a, b, c and combining them with I(Ca, a), I(Cb, b), I(Cc, c)
and I(G¯, ∗), in a way as shown in the following figures (in all figures, we ignore the real line for the sake
of simplicity). Notice that in some cases of the construction, we turn over the 2-interval representations of
some components of G. We further distinguish between the following subcases mainly based on the shapes
of the left-most intervals of I(Ca, a), I(Cb, b) and I(Cc, c). Due to symmetry, it suffices to consider the
following subcases.
Case 1.1. For each x ∈ {a, b, c}, the left-most x-interval in I(Cx, x) is a non-trivial interval. Clearly, in
this case a, b, c are degree-3 vertices in G. We can then construct I(G, v) as shown in the following figure.
I1a I
1
b I
1
c
I2vI1v
I2a
I(Ca, a)
I2b
I(Cb, b)
I2c
I(Cc, c) I(G¯, ∗)
I(G, v)
For ease of exposition, in all following cases, we only give the preconditions of each case and show I(G, v)
in a figure, which is a refined combination of the 2-interval representations of some components of G.
Case 1.2. The left-most b-interval and the left-most c-internal in I(Cb, b) and I(Cc, c), respectively, are
non-trivial intervals, and the left-most a-interval in I(Ca, a) is a trivial interval. Clearly, both b and c are
degree-3 vertices in G. Assume first that a is a degree-2 or degree-3 vertex in G.
I1b I
1
c
I2vI1v
I1a
I(Ca, a)
I2b
I(Cb, b)
I2c
I(Cc, c) I(G¯, ∗)
If a is a degree-1 vertex in G, according to the above claim, a can only be represented by a trivial interval
in I(G, v). In this case, we replace the part in the rectangle in the above figure with the following one.
I2v
I1a
I(Ca, a)
Case 1.3. The left-most c-interval in I(Cc, c) is a non-trivial interval, and the left-most a-interval and
left-most b-interval in I(Ca, a) and I(Cb, b), respectively, are trivial intervals. Assume first that a and b are
degree-2 or degree-3 vertices in G. In the following figure, I(Ca, a) is turned over.
I1c
I1v I(Ca, a)
I1a I
1
b
I(Cb, b)I2v
I2c
I(Cc, c) I(G¯, ∗)
In the case that a or b, or both are degree-1vertices in G, we replace the part in the rectangle in the
above figure with one of the following ones (from left to right the figures correspond to the cases (1) both a
and b are degree-1 vertices; (2) only a is a degree-1 vertex; (3) only b is a degree-1 vertex).
I1a
I(Ca, a)
I1b
I(Cb, b)I2v
I1a
I(Ca, a)
I1b
I(Cb, b)I2v I(Ca, a)
I1a I1b
I(Cb, b)I2v
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Case 1.4. For each x ∈ {a, b, c}, the left-most x-interval in I(Cx, x) is a trivial interval. The following
figure is for the case that a, b, c are degree-2 or degree-3 vertices in G. The case that some of a, b, c or all of
them are degree-1 vertices in G are dealt with similar to Cases 1.2 and 1.3.
I1v
I1a
I(Ca, a)
I1b
I(Cb, b)
I1c
I(Cc, c)I2v I(G¯, ∗)
Case 2. v is in a cycle in G.
Obviously, two of {a, b, c} are the neighbors of v in the cycle. Without loss of generality, assume that
a and b are the two neighbors of v in the cycle denoted by O = (v, a, u1, u2, . . . , ut, b). We can construct
I(O, v) as follows.
I1v
I2vI
1
a
I1u1
I1ut
I1b
I1u2
Let G′ be the graph obtained from G by deleting v and all edges in the cycle O. By the induction, there
is a 2-interval representation I(G′, c) of G′ which satisfies all conditions stated in the claim. In particular,
each vertex in {a, u1, . . . , ut, b} is represented by a trivial interval in I(G′, c). Then, by a similar method as
used above we can construct I(G, v) by combining I(O, v) and I(G′, c). We have three subcases here.
Case 2.1. The left-most c-interval in I(G′, c) is a non-trivial interval. In this case, c must be a degree-3
vertex in G.
I1v I
1
c
I1a
I1u1
I1ut
I1b
I1u2 I
2
v I
2
c
I(O, v) I(G′, c)
I(G, v)
Case 2.2. The left-most c-interval in I(G′, c) is a trivial interval and c is a degree-2 or degree-3 vertex
in G.
I1v
I1a
I1u1
I1ut
I1b
I1u2 I
2
v
I1c
I(O, v)
I(G′, c)
Case 2.3. The left-most c-interval in I(G′, c) is a trivial interval and c is a degree-1 vertex in G.
I1v I
1
c
I1a
I1u1
I1ut
I1b
I1u2 I
2
v
I(O, v) I(G′, c)
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Consider now the case that v is a degree-2 vertex, say NG(v) = {a, b}. The proof can be much simpler. In
particular, if v is not in any cycle in G, we construct I(G, v) similar to Case 1 by distinguish between several
subcases, each of which can be obtained from one of Cases 1.1-1.3 by removing I(Cc, c) and c-intervals. In
addition, if a trivial v-interval intersects a c-interval, we remove this v-interval too. Moreover, if a non-
trivial v-interval intersects a c-interval, we remove the edge of the v-interval and the common endpoint of
the v-interval and the c-interval. For instance, if the left-most a-interval in I(Ca, a) is a trivial interval, the
left-most b-interval in I(Cb, b) is a non-trivial interval, and a is a degree-2 vertex in G, we construct I(G, v)
as follows (obtained from Case 1.2 by performing the above operations). Here, I(Cx, x) where x ∈ {a, b} is
as defined in Case 1.
I1b
I1v I
2
v
I1a
I(Ca, a)
I2b
I(Cb, b) I(G¯, ∗)
If v is in some cycle O = (v, a, u1, u2, . . . , ut, b), let G
′ be obtained from G by deleting v and all edges in
O. Let c′ be any vertex in V \ {v, a, b}. Then, we can construct I(G, v) by combining I(O, v) and I(G′, c′)
without any intersection, where I(O, v) is as shown in Case 2 and I(G′, c′) is a 2-interval representation of
G′ satisfying all conditions in the claim.
For the case that v is a degree-1 vertex in G, let NG(v) = {a} and G′ = G \ {v}. The following 3 figures
show I(G, v) in all possible cases.
I1a
I1v
I2a
I(G′, a) I1v
I1a
I(G′, a)
I1a
I1v I(G′, a)
Finally, if v is an isolated vertex in G, we simply create a trivial interval for v aside the 2-interval
representation of G \ {v} satisfying all conditions in the claim.
The above proof implies a polynomial-time algorithm for the construction of a 2-interval representation
that satisfies all conditions stated in the claim of a graph G of maximum degree 3 and a vertex v of G. In
general, the algorithm iteratively decomposes the graph G based on the above cases on v. For subgraphs
of constant sizes in the decompositions, we directly calculate the 2-interval representations satisfying all
conditions in the claim in polynomial-time. Then, we iteratively combine the 2-interval representations
using the constructions in the above cases to construct the desired 2-interval representation of G.
Given a 2-interval representation I(G, v) as discussed above, a 2-interval representation of G satisfying
all conditions stated in Lemma 4 can be computed in polynomial-time, by adding some dummy intervals
for degree-(≤ 2) vertices. 
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